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Notes
Autonomy and Accountability: The University of
California and the State Constitution
On March 23, 1868, the California Legislature passed an act creat-
ing the University of California.' In 1879 the California Constitution
declared the University "a public trust."'2 The University's Regents ad-
minister this trust.3 The state constitution grants the Regents "full pow-
ers of organization and government" over the University, permitting
legislative control only to "insure ... the security of its funds."'4 This
grant has enabled the Regents to exercise virtually complete independent
control over University operations. California courts have regularly con-
firmed this broad authority, solicitously guarding the independence
granted the University in the state constitution.5 The tradition of aca-
demic freedom, linked as it is to the protection of free speech, has en-
hanced public and legislative respect for the University's constitutionally
ordained autonomy.6
1. Organic Act of 1868, ch. 244, 1867-68 Cal. Stat. 244, 248.
2. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 9.
3. The Regents comprise the University's governing board. See CAL. CONST. art. IX,
§ 9.
4. Id.
5. See Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 219 Cal. 663, 664, 28 P.2d 355, 355
(undergraduate curriculum), aff'd, 293 U.S. 245 (1934); People v. Kewen, 69 Cal. 215, 10 P.
393 (1886) (management of Hastings Law College); Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal.,
248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 879-81, 57 Cal. Rptr. 463, 472-73 (1967) (student conduct); Newmarker
v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 160 Cal. App. 2d 640, 648, 325 P.2d 558, 564 (1958) (employee
fringe benefits); Wall v. Board of Regents, 38 Cal. App. 2d 698, 102 P.2d 533 (1940) (faculty
qualifications); Williams v. Wheeler, 23 Cal. App. 619, 622, 138 P. 937, 939 (1913) (student
admissions policies).
6. The doctrine of "academic freedom" involves the freedom of individual faculty mem-
bers to teach and conduct research without administrative interference. In a series of cases in
the 1950s and 1960s, the United States Supreme Court gave academic freedom constitutional
status under the protection of first amendment freedom of speech. The most famous of these
cases is Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957). In Sweezy, a state attorney general
brought suit to force a lecturer to disclose the contents of a lecture given at a state university.
The lecturer claimed that this demand infringed upon his first amendment rights. The Court
upheld this defense, finding that the governmental interest did not outweigh the individual
speaker's first amendment rights, preserved against state interference by the due process clause
of the fourteenth amendment. In a concurring opinion, Justice Frankfurter emphasized the
vital importance of preventing governmental intrusion in the intellectual life of a university.
He quoted extensively from The Open University in South Africa, a treatise by several South
[927]
Nevertheless, there are spheres of legislative authority that override
this independence. California courts have declared that University poli-
cies and regulations are subordinate to the police power of the legisla-
ture,7 to the provisions of the federal Constitution," and to the general
policies of state government. 9 Matters which are "exclusively university
affairs," such as decisions concerning faculty employment or student ad-
missions, fall within the scope of the University's autonomy. 10 Con-
versely, issues of general statewide concern are outside the scope of that
autonomy and the courts have held that the University is not free to
deviate from statewide policies and laws governing such matters."
In the past decade, a number of areas of conflict between the legisla-
ture and the University of California have brought about challenges to
the traditional independence of the University. These conflicts reflect
complex changes in the University's internal and external political and
social relationships, changes that have resulted from its tremendous
growth. Under these circumstances, the continuing judicial deference to
the University's autonomy has resulted in increased University power in
many areas bearing, at best, a questionable relationship to academic free-
dom and the purposes of the public trust.
This Note argues that the tendency of California's courts not only to
affirm, but to broaden, the University's autonomy in the face of legisla-
tive and other challenges stems from a misperception that "matters of
statewide concern" and "exclusively University affairs" are mutually ex-
clusive. In fact, the changing character of University-society relations
indicates that exclusively University affairs may be-indeed often are-
matters of statewide concern.
A recognition of the wide-ranging changes in the University's struc-
ture and functions, as well as a reexamination of the legal and philosoph-
ical bases upon which University autonomy rests, leads to the conclusion
African professors that formulated a broader doctrine protecting institutions rather than indi-
viduals, delineating the "four essential freedoms of a university-to determine for itself on
academic grounds who may teach, what may be taught, how it shall be taught, and who may
be admitted to study." 354 U.S. at 262-63 (Frankfurter, J., concurring). See infra Section IV
for a further discussion of academic freedom.
7. Williams v. Wheeler, 23 Cal. App. 619, 625, 138 P. 937, 940 (1913) (public health).
8. See Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 875, 57 Cal.
Rptr. 463, 469 (1967) (regulations on student conduct may not require students to waive con-
stitutional rights).
9. See infra text accompanying notes 35-45.
10. Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal. 2d 708, 712-13, 249 P.2d 280, 282-83 (1952) (employee
loyalty oath is matter of general statewide concern and Regents may not specify an oath at
variance from the oath required of all state employees); see also Wall v. Board of Regents, 38
Cal. App. 2d 698, 102 P.2d 533 (1940) (employment of faculty); Williams v. Wheeler, 23 Cal.
App. 619, 138 P. 937 (1913) (admissions requirements).
11. Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal. 2d 708, 712-13, 249 P.2d 280, 282-83 (1952). See gener-
ally Horowitz, The Autonomy of the University of California Under the State Constitution, 25
UCLA L. REv. 23 (1978).
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that the policy of automatic, nearly unquestioning support for that au-
tonomy needs to be reconsidered. This conclusion emerges from an ex-
amination of several situations in which the legislature has attempted to
regulate the University's treatment of its employees. One of these situa-
tions involves the issue of University autonomy in determining proce-
dures affecting the retention and promotion of academic personnel.' 2
The State of California has expressed specific concerns in overseeing state
employee relations and labor practices, yet the University remains essen-
tially autonomous in these areas.' 3 This Note argues that the Univer-
sity's treatment of its personnel, although an "exclusively University
affair," is nevertheless a "matter of statewide concern" and therefore
should be subject to a greater degree of legislative oversight.
Section I examines the history of the University of California and its
legal status as a constitutionally autonomous state agency. Section II
looks at the growth of the University since its founding. It considers
both internal changes and broad modifications in the University's rela-
tion to the society within which it exists. Section III examines legislative
attempts to regulate University activities, concentrating on two instances
in which the legislature unsuccessfully tried to exercise power over Uni-
versity employment practices and employee relations. This section fo-
cuses in particular on the controversy surrounding the Open Files Act of
1977,14 which considerably extended the rights of access of academic per-
sonnel to certain material in their personnel files. Section IV analyzes the
concepts of academic freedom and institutional autonomy that have tra-
ditionally protected the University of California and universities in gen-
eral from legislative control. This section demonstrates that the values
these concepts are intended to protect can often best be preserved by
legislative or judicial oversight. The section then examines the growing
acceptance of such oversight in the area of collective-bargaining rights
for academic personnel. The Note concludes that, given the extent of the
University's present-day operations and its pervasive significance to the
state, the scope of its autonomy should be limited. The state should be
allowed broader oversight of University operations, particularly person-
nel-related policies, in light of the strong state interest in affording fair
treatment to all its employees.
12. An ongoing controversy surrounds the use of confidential information in the Univer-
sity's academic personnel procedures. See Petition for Writ of Mandate, Scharf v. Regents of
the Univ. of Cal., No. 544468-5 (Cal. Super. Ct., County of Alameda, filed May 6, 1986). In
Scharf, six individual plaintiffs and the University [of California] Council of the American
Federation of Teachers challenge the University's confidential files system as a violation of the
due process guarantees of the United States and California Constitutions, the right to privacy
guarantee of the California Constitution, and Education Code § 92612. See also infra notes
75-79 and accompanying text.
13. See infra section III.




Daniel Webster's plea on behalf of the Dartmouth College Trustees
has remained a cogent and compelling argument in support of freeing
systems of higher education from the political interference of state gov-
ernment. In arguing the case for the autonomy of colonial colleges, Web-
ster concluded:
They have flourished, hitherto, and have become in a high degree
respectable and useful to the community. They have all a common
principle of existence, the inviolability of their charters. It will be a
dangerous, a most dangerous experiment, to hold these institutions
subject to the rise and fall of popular parties, and the fluctuations of
political opinions .... [L]earned men will be deterred from devoting
themselves to the service of such institutions, from the precarious title
of their offices. Colleges and halls will be deserted by all better spirits
and become a theatre for the contention of politics. Party and faction
will be cherished in the places consecrated to piety and learning. 15
Like Dartmouth College, the University of California was intended
to be a place consecrated to learning. As one historian noted:
By design, the University of California was... intended to be apoliti-
cal. In reality, it could not be. It was the creature of the people of the
state. Right or wrong, they would exercise their right to criticize or to
applaud the institution they regarded as the capstone of their public
education system.16
The University was established in 1868 as California's land-grant
University. The Organic Act of 1868 described in detail the University's
governing structure and curricula, yet it granted the University substan-
tial discretion in the handling of its affairs. 17 In the early 1870s, work-
ingmen and farmers challenged the notion that the people of California
were served as well by the comprehensive University that had been estab-
lished as they might be by a narrower institution offering instruction in
agriculture and the mechanical arts."' At the same time, the public and
the legislature began to question the Regents' authority. 19 In 1874, the
Regents entrusted construction of the College of Letters (North Hall) to
one of their own, Dr. Samuel Merritt. Dr. Merritt was allowed consider-
able latitude in changing specifications, and he was given a special legis-
lative exemption from a statute that required work on public buildings to
15. Trustees of Dartmouth College v. Woodward, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 518, 598 (1819).
16. V. STADTMAN, THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, 1868-1968, at 2 (1970).
17. Organic Act of 1868, ch. 244, 1867-68 Cal. Stat. 244. The federal Morrill Land Grant
College Act of 1862 gave each state in the union a grant of 30,000 acres for each of its senators
and representatives. The funds received from the sale of the land were to be held as a perpet-
ual trust for the endowment of at least one college. W. FERRIER, ORIGIN AND DEVELOP-
MENT OF THE UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA 44-46 (1930).
18. W. FERRIER, supra note 17, at 32-37.
19. Id. at 355-59.
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be done during the day and under the eight-hour system.20 Public
charges were made that Merritt and his friends profited financially while
the University acquired an inferior building at exorbitant costs. The en-
suing scandal led to a legislative inquiry. In the aftermath of that in-
quiry, the Regents became convinced that the state's political climate
was hostile to the development of the University.2 1
In 1879, the California Constitutional Convention, seeking a suita-
ble mechanism to ensure reasonable political autonomy for the Univer-
sity, adopted article IX, section 9 of the California Constitution. In the
more than one hundred years since the University was first given consti-
tutional status, the provisions describing the University and its govern-
ance have been substantially amended four times-in 1918, 1970, 1974,
and 1976. Three of those amendments limited the autonomous operation
of the University. In 1970, the legislature passed, and the electorate
adopted, a constitutional amendment to article IX, section 9, which re-
quired meetings of the Regents to be open to the public, with certain
exceptions. 22 The 1974 amendment shortened the length of Regents'
terms of office from sixteen to twelve years and required that the ap-
pointed Regents be "broadly reflective of the economic, cultural, and so-
cial diversity of the state, including ethnic minorities and women. ' 23 In
1976, the constitution was again amended to authorize the legislature to
regulate "competitive bidding procedures... for the letting of construc-
tion contracts, sales of real property, and purchasing of materials, goods
and services by the University." 24 The University, in its ballot argument
against this provision, contended that the amendment would "undermine
the independence of the University and would result in greater costs" to
the people of the state.25 "University administrators expressed fears that
the regulations could force the University to purchase superficially simi-
lar lower-cost items which would not meet researchers' precise require-
ments or that, where the desired products did not exist, the University
would be unable to negotiate with an individual contractor to develop
them."' 26 However, these arguments did not prevail and the amendment
passed.
As amended, article IX, section 9 vests in the Regents of the Univer-
20. V. STADTMAN, supra note 16, at 78-80.
21. Id. at 70, 76.
22. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 9(g).
23. Id. § 9(d).
24. Id. § 9(a).
25. CALIFORNIA SECRETARY OF STATE, CALIFORNIA VOTERS PAMPHLET (Nov. 2,
1976).
26. A. Zusman, The Legislature and the University: Conflict in Higher Education 166
(Dec. 15, 1982) (unpublished dissertation, available in University of California, Berkeley,
library).
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sity of California extensive control over the University's affairs. The sec-
tion states in part:
The University of California shall constitute a public trust, to be
administered by the existing corporation known as "The Regents of
the University of California," with full powers of organization and
government, subject only to such legislative control as may be neces-
sary to insure the security of its funds and compliance with the terms
of the endowments of the university ....
... Said corporation shall also have all the powers necessary or
convenient for the effective administration of its trust, including the
power to sue and to be sued, to use a seal, and to delegate to its com-
mittees or to the faculty of the university, or to others, such authority
or functions as it may deem wise.... The university shall be entirely
independent of all political or sectarian influence and kept free there-
from in the appointment of its regents and in the administration of its
affairs .... 27
A constitutional provision, vesting power over a higher education
system in a governing board denotes the constitutional status of that sys-
tem, but such a provision is not self-executing. "Constitutional auton-
omy" refers to the degree of control exercised by the governing board in
relation to external state governmental entities.28
A number of court decisions have affirmed the extensive autonomy
granted the University of California by the California Constitution. In-
terpreting the state constitution's grant of "full powers of governance,"
the courts have upheld the University's right to employ socially contro-
versial figures as lecturers,29 to enforce order on campus "by all appro-
priate means," including the suspension or dismissal of students,30 to use
or manage its property without regulation by local government, 31 and to
27. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 9(a), (f).
28. Fifteen states confer constitutional status on their respective higher education sys-
tems. The precise degree of constitutional autonomy available to a given system can be deter-
mined only by examining the case law interpreting the constitutional grant. See L. GLENNY &
T.K. DALGLISH, PUBLIC UNIVERSITIES, STATE AGENCIES AND THE LAW: CONSTITU-
TIONAL AUTONOMY IN DECLINE 15 (1973); CHARTERS AND BASIC LAWS OF SELECTED
AMERICAN UNIVERSITIES AND COLLEGES (E.C. Elliott & M.M. Chambers eds. 1934) [herein-
after CHARTERS AND BASIC LAWS]. Glenny and Dalglish cite 14 states as having constitution-
ally autonomous universities. In 1977 Nebraska joined the list. See Board of Regents v. Exon,
256 N.W.2d 330 (Neb. 1977).
29. Wall v. Board of Regents, 38 Cal. App. 2d 698 699-700, 102 P.2d 533, 534 (1940).
Wall sought to prevent the Regents from employing the famous socialist, Bertrand Russell, as
an instructor.
30. Goldberg v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 248 Cal. App. 2d 867, 874, 57 Cal. Rptr.
463, 468 (1967).
31. Oakland Raiders v. City of Berkeley, 65 Cal. App. 3d 623, 626, 137 Cal. Rptr. 648,
650 (1976). A similar issue has recently arisen regarding the claimed exemption of Hastings
College of the Law, an affiliate of the University of California, from local planning and zoning
laws. The issue involves Hastings' intention to build a six-story office building on property it
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ignore locally prevailing wage rates in setting salaries for its employees,
even though some state agencies were compelled to meet prevailing
rates.32
Statutes have also contributed to the University's autonomy. One of
the most important of these is the Donahue Higher Education Act of
1976, which sets forth the missions and levels of instruction of each of
California's three public systems of higher education: the University of
California, the State Colleges and Universities system, and the Commu-
nity College system.33 The Donahue Act ensures the University's mo-
nopoly over doctoral programs, thereby consolidating the University's
power in relation to other institutions.
The University's autonomy is nevertheless limited by the legisla-
ture's own extensive powers. These powers include authority over the
appropriation of state monies; exercise of the general police power to pro-
vide for the public health, safety, and welfare; and legislation on matters
of "general statewide concern," which are not "exclusively University
affairs."'34 As a rule, California courts have recognized the University's
obligation to conform to legislative policies of the state government only
when the legislature has specifically included the University in the rele-
vant statute.35
The state constitution vests the legislature with the responsibility to
support the University through the appropriation of state monies: article
IV, section 12 of the constitution empowers the legislature to "control
the submission, approval, and enforcement of budgets and the filing of
claims for all State agencies."' 36 Thus, the legislature can establish fiscal
controls over the University by placing limitations and conditions on the
University's use of monies appropriated by the state. "For example, the
Legislature has inserted [into University appropriations bills] budget
control language requiring that certain funds be used only to support
additional primary care medical residencies. Other budget control lan-
owns in the college's neighborhood, San Francisco's Tenderloin district. It is unclear whether
Hastings bases its claimed exemption on its status as a branch of the University or its status as
a state entity. (State-owned buildings are exempt from local planning and zoning laws in Cali-
fornia.) See Bill Aimed at Hastings May Affect Whole U.C. System, San Francisco Chronicle,
Mar. 27, 1986, at 6, col. 4; Hastings College Plans Tenderloin Building, San Francisco Chroni-
cle, June 19, 1985, at 5, col. 1.
32. San Francisco Labor Council v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 26 Cal. 3d 785, 608
P.2d 277, 279-80, 163 Cal. Rptr. 460, 462-63 (1980); see infra section III.A.
33. CAL. EDUC. CODE §§ 66500, 66608, 66701 (West 1978 & Supp. 1987).
34. Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal. 2d 708, 712, 249 P.2d 280, 282 (1952); see also
Horowitz, supra note 11, at 37-38.
35. See California State Employees Ass'n v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 267 Cal. App.
2d 667, 668, 73 Cal. Rptr. 449, 450 (1968) (law governing state personnel policies that did not
specifically include the University did not apply to the University). Even explicit inclusion of
the University in a statute will not always suffice. See infra section III.B.
36. CAL. CONST. art. IV, § 12(c).
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guage temporarily prohibited the University from expending funds for
new large-scale computers." 37
Even outside the fiscal realm, the constitutional grant to the Univer-
sity of "full powers of organization and government" does not accord
absolute power of self-governance. There are limitations beyond which
the Regents cannot go. "The power vested under the Constitution in the
Regents is not so broad as to destroy or limit the general power of the
Legislature to enact laws for-the general welfare of the public." 38 "It is
well settled ...that laws passed by the Legislature under its general
police power will prevail over regulations made by the regents with re-
gard to matters which are not exclusively university affairs."' 39 Matters
of "statewide concern" are not "exclusive university affairs. ' 4°
In the landmark case of Tolman v. Underhill4 the California
Supreme Court held that, since the loyalty of teachers was a matter of
statewide concern, the University could not impose on faculty members a
loyalty oath diverging from that required of all state employees. Simi-
larly, in Regents of the University of California v. Superior Court,42 the
supreme court held that the University was subject to the provisions of
statewide usury laws. The court stated that the University's "investment
decisions are not so closely related to its educational decisions as to cloak
the former with immunity even if the latter are immune. '43 In contrast,
in Newmarker v. Regents of the University of California,44 an appellate
court held that "the employment and wage conditions of University em-
ployees at different campuses is [not] a matter of general statewide
concern."
'45
The decisions focusing on matters of statewide concern reflect an
attempt to define and delineate internal university affairs as invariably
and inevitably separate from statewide concerns. But that attempt itself,
as seen in the decisions, evidences a conception of what the University
is-or should be-which sometimes fails to see what the University has
become.
37. A. Zusman, supra note 26, at 25.
38. Wallace v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 75 Cal. App. 274, 278, 242 P. 892, 894
(1925); see also In re Estate of Royer, 123 Cal. 614, 624, 56 P. 461, 470 (1899) (The University
is "not the sovereign.").
39. Tolman v. Underhill, 39 Cal. 2d 708, 712, 249 P.2d 280, 282 (1952).
40. Id. But see Horowitz, supra note 11, at 41 ("That a legislative regulation deals with a
matter of statewide concern would not be a compelling argument for validity of application to
the University, for the Regents are delegated powers of government with respect to one cate-
gory of matters of statewide concern-University affairs.").
41. 39 Cal. 2d 708, 712-13, 249 P.2d 280, 282-83 (1952).
42. 17 Cal. 3d 533, 551 P.2d 844, 131 Cal. Rptr. 228 (1976).
43. Id. at 537, 551 P.2d at 537, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 230.
44. 160 Cal. App. 2d 640, 325 P.2d 558 (1958).
45. Id. at 648, 325 P.2d at 564.
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II. The Modern University
Before 1900, American universities were quiet enclaves having little
direct impact on the outside world and little to do with the corporations,
banks, and legislative bodies that were transforming America into a mod-
em industrial state. Less than five percent of the nation's youth attended
college.46 In 1870, the University of California had forty students and
ten faculty members.4 7 At the time of the Constitutional Convention in
1879, the student body had grown to 332.48 "Few universities enrolled
more than a thousand students or employed as many as a hundred
professors. There were no large endowments, no foundation grants, no
federal funding for research. ' '49 In terms of internal governance and re-
lations with the state, the principles of academic freedom and constitu-
tional autonomy offered these small and rather detached universities a
workable means to protect faculty members from the meddlings of a dis-
tant and conservative world. After World War II, however, the image of
the ivory tower rapidly grew obsolete. Instead, a vast and intricate net-
work arose linking universities to other major institutions in society.50
Thus, by 1962, the University of California had "operations in over
a hundred locations, counting campuses, experiment stations, agricul-
tural and urban extension centers, and projects abroad involving more
than fifty countries; nearly 10,000 courses in its catalogues; some form of
contact with nearly every industry, nearly every level of government,
nearly every person in its region."' 51 Today, the University has over
135,000 students, 20,000 faculty members, and a total staff of over
75,000.52 In 1982, its total operating budget was approximately $4.3 bil-
lion, of which state appropriations comprised thirty-nine percent.53
The University of California is among the major research universi-
ties in the United States, receiving approximately $500 million from the
federal government for research purposes, exclusive of the $1.2 billion in
federal contract funds for its three major nuclear research and develop-
ment laboratories.5 4 In addition, as a result of private industry's interest
in university research and university interest in private funding of re-
search efforts, a new alliance has been forged between the campus and
46. D. BOK, BEYOND THE IVORY TOWER: SOCIAL RESPONSIBILITY OF THE MODERN
UNIVERSITY 3 (1982).
47. V. STADTMAN, supra note 16, at 52, 86.
48. W. FERRIER, supra note 17, at 374.
49. D. BoK, supra note 46, at 3.
50. Id. at 7.
51. C. KERR, THE USES OF THE UNIVERSITY 7 (1963).
52. UNIVERISTY OF CALIFORNIA, STATISTICAL SUMMARY (Fall 1985).
53. A. Zusman, supra note 26, at 21.
54. Id.
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the corporate world.5 5 The legal and policy implications of these devel-
opments are enormous. The University's ties with the private sector cre-
ate complex problems concerning the structuring of research agreements,
patent and licensing arrangements, and trade secrets.5 6 This new situa-
tion raises the spectre of conflicts of interest for both faculty researchers
and the institution.57 The Carnegie Foundation has concluded that the
connection between industry and higher education will be "[t]he most
dramatic governance issue of the future. '5 8 The scale of this activity has
placed the University at the focus of pressures far different from anything
envisioned by those who granted its autonomy in 1879.
The areas in which, in the recent period, the University of California
has come into conflict with forces both within and beyond its walls are
well known. Students and faculty have mounted concerted efforts to al-
ter the University's practices of internal governance, its curricula, its re-
lation to other government agencies, such as the United States
Department of Energy, for whom the University administers weapons
laboratories, and its relation to foreign states, as illustrated by the pres-
sure to cease its investments in corporations doing business in the Union
of South Africa. In the 1960s and '70s, campuses became focal points of
student concerns over social and political issues, particularly the role of
the United States in the Vietnam conflict. In diverse ways, students,
faculty, and staff have created pressure to urge the University of Califor-
nia to respond to their concerns as employees or as participants in the
University's functioning.
Publicity concerning conflicts within the University, and public
awareness of the University's growing connections with government and
industry have led to increased efforts by groups within the larger society
to influence or determine University conduct, policies, or practices. For
example, since a number of University researchers engage in publicly
funded research that could benefit commercial firms for which they con-
sult or which they themselves have founded, important questions of pro-
priety have arisen. Legislators have expressed concern that private
monies and the lure of profits could distort the University's academic and
public goals if these lures inhibit researchers from freely disseminating
ideas and research findings of potential commercial value. 59 In other in-
55. See, e.g., Bach & Thornton, Academic-Industrial Partnerships in Biomedical Re-
search: Inevitability and Desirability, 64 EDUC. REC. 26 (1983).
56. See Fowler, University-Industry Research Relationships: The Research Agreement, 9
J.C. & U.L. 515 (1982-83).
57. See Comment, Ties that Bind: Conflict of Interest in University-Industry Links, 17
U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 895 (1984); see also Fowler, supra note 56, at 532.
58. CARNEGIE FOUNDATION FOR THE ADVANCEMENT OF TEACHING BULLETIN 88
(1982).
59. In 1980, the University adopted a Conflict of Interest Code pursuant to the require-
ments of the Political Reform Act of 1974. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 87300-87312 (West 1976).
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stances, public interest groups and legislators have questioned use of the
University's public funds for research that does not anticipate a public
benefit.60 The general concern underlying all these pressures is that the
extension of the University's reach and power be accompanied by an ex-
tension of its accountability.
Other areas of conflict or pressure, notably labor relations problems,
have resulted in attempts to determine or regulate University of Califor-
nia activity by legislative enactment. Such enactments have provided the
most complex and consequential tests of the University's autonomy.
Ill. Legislative Intervention
The California Legislature has been generally, and persistently, re-
luctant to intervene in University affairs. 61 Nevertheless, when public
policy concerns have appeared to be of overriding importance, the legis-
lature has enacted laws designed to limit the University's political inde-
pendence.62 In 1977, the California Legislature passed two bills, each of
which regulated the University's treatment of its personnel: the Prevail-
ing Wage Rate Act, 63 which was directed at nonacademic personnel, and
the Open Files Act,64 which was directed at academic personnel.
The Prevailing Wage Rate Act, the Open Files Act, and the judicial
response to them, raise questions about University autonomy and the leg-
islature's power to guarantee fair and equitable treatment of state em-
ployees. An examination of the controversy surrounding these Acts
provides a focus for reconsideration of these questions.
A. The Prevailing Wage Rate Act
The Prevailing Wage Rate Act required that, when setting mini-
mum and maximum salary limits for employees in various localities, the
The Code requires designated employees to file statements of economic interest with the Uni-
versity and the Fair Political Practices Commission. In 1977 members of the University
faculty brought suit against the Regents to enjoin them from preparing and enforcing the
Code. The plaintiffs claimed that application of the Political Reform Act to the University
would violate the University's autonomy under CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 9. On motion for
summary judgment, the trial court held that the Act was not unconstitutional and would not
"constitute an impermissible impairment of the Regents' powers of organization and govern-
ment." Barnett v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., No. 491611-8 (Super. Ct. Cal., County of
Alameda, May 6, 1977); see also Horowitz, supra note 11, at 30 n.25.
60. See, e.g., AB 1192 & 1537, 1977-78 Regular Session of the California Legislature;
CALIFORNIA AGRARIAN ACTION PROJECT, No HANDS TOUCH THE LAND (1977). The Cali-
fornia Constitution forbids the use of public monies for purposes which do not produce a
public benefit. CAL CONST. art. XVI, § 6. For a general discussion of this "public purpose"
doctrine, see McAllister, Public Purpose in Taxation, 18 CALIF. L. REv. 137 (1930).
61. See A. Zusman, supra note 26, at 217.
62. Id. at 218.
63. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 92611 (West Supp. 1985).
64. Id. § 92612.
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Regents take into account local prevailing wage rates for laborers, work-
men, and mechanics employed on an hourly or per diem basis. The law
required that the Regents "shall not fix the minimum salary limits below
the general prevailing wage rate so ascertained for the various
localities." 65
When the University refused to implement the statutory process for
determining wages, a coalition of Bay Area labor organizations brought a
class action suit to compel the Regents to comply with the law. In this
action, San Francisco Labor Council v. University of California, 66 the Re-
gents won at the trial level but lost on appeal. Relying on Tolman, the
appellate court held that the statute was a valid exercise of the legisla-
ture's police powers.67 The court found that the legislature had acted
with "the singular objective of inclusion of a specific class of University
employees within a broad statutory scheme." 68
The Supreme Court of California overturned the decision, holding
that the law was an unconstitutional invasion of the University's auton-
omy under article IX, section 9.69 The court stated that a prevailing
wage regulation, applied to the University, was not a matter of statewide
concern, despite the legislature's explicit declaration to the contrary.
The court based its opinion on an earlier decision which had held that
"the determination of wages paid to employees of charter cities as well as
charter counties is a matter of local rather than statewide concern." '70
In analogizing the University to charter cities and counties, the
court ignored several significant differences betweeen the "independence"
of charter cities and the "independence" of the University. First, the
University, unlike charter cities, depends upon the legislature for its
funds.71 Second, charter cities elect their local governing authorities as
well as their representatives in the state legislature; University Regents
are appointed by the governor.72 Third, the University is a multiunit,
multicity employer that transcends local boundaries. To the extent that
its employees are to be treated as public employees, they should be
65. Id. § 92611.
66. 147 Cal. Rptr. 790, depublished on grant of reh'g, (Aug. 1978), aff'd, 150 Cal. Rptr.
671 (1978), depublished on grant of review, (Feb. 1979), rev'd, 26 Cal. 3d 785, 608 P.2d 277,
163 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1980). The California Supreme Court can order certain opinions of the
court of appeal "depublished," that is, not printed in the official reports. For a discussion of
the depublication process, see Grodin, The Depublication Practice of the California Supreme
Court, 72 CALI. L. REV. 514 (1984).
67. 147 Cal. Rptr. at 793-94; 150 Cal. Rptr. at 674-75.
68. 147 Cal. Rptr. at 794.
69. San Francisco Labor Council v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 26 Cal. 3d 785, 791, 608
P.2d 277, 280, 163 Cal. Rptr. 460, 463 (1980).
70. Id. at 790, 608 P.2d at 279, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 462 (citing Sonoma County Org. of Pub.
Employees v. County of Sonoma, 23 Cal. 3d 296, 591 P.2d 1, 152 Cal. Rptr. 903 (1979)).
71. See supra text accompanying notes 36-37.
72. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 9.
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treated as employees of the state rather than of any given municipality.
Finally, and most significantly, the relationship between separate levels
of government is different from that between separate branches of gov-
ernment at the same level.73
Despite the deficiencies in its reasoning, San Francisco Labor Coun-
cil was a major triumph for the University. The decision marked the first
time a statute had been held invalid because it violated the Regents' con-
stitutionally assigned powers of governance. The precedential value of
the case led almost immediately to a second victory for the University's
broad view of its autonomy. That victory came in the form of a superior
court decision holding the Open Files Act "unconstitutional as beyond
the police power of the legislature as limited by article IX, section 9 of
the California Constitution. '74
B. The Open Files Controversy
The Open Files Act had provided all University employees broad-
ened rights of access to their personnel files, including access to material
the University deems "confidential." At the University of California, as
at most research universities, letters of reference by scholars in a candi-
date's field are a basic component of the process for the recruitment, ten-
ure, and promotion of academic personnel. These letters, which the
University maintains as confidential, form part of a candidate's personnel
file, on which review is based.75 Confidential "ad hoe" committees of
faculty members are established at the campus level to review a depart-
ment's request that an individual be granted appointment, tenure, or pro-
motion. An ad hoc committee's recommendation to grant or deny tenure
or promotion is also considered confidential, as are the reports and rec-
ommendations of the department chairperson and the dean. 76 In recog-
nition of the University's use of confidential letters of evaluation in its
academic peer-review process, the Act gave the Regents the right to pro-
tect the identity of evaluators by deleting their names and affiliations
73. Even assuming, arguendo, the appropriateness of the charter-city analogy, it is signifi-
cant to note that the California Supreme Court itself has found occasion to delimit the scope of
"municipal affairs." For example, the court has held that although some aspects of regulation
of public employment in charter cities are municipal affairs, such as policies concerning hiring
and salaries, a state statute could validly regulate other aspects of public employer-employee
relations. "The total effect of all this legislation was not to deprive local government ... of the
right to manage and control ... but to create uniform fair labor practices throughout the
state." Professional Fire Fighters, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles, 60 Cal. 2d 276, 294-95, 384 P.2d
158, 169, 32 Cal. Rptr. 830, 841 (1963).
74. Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Deukmejian, No. C 266242 (Super. Ct. Cal., County of
Los Angeles, Aug. 21, 1980).
75. While many universities also adhere to a policy of confidentiality, others, such as the
universities of Wisconsin, Colorado, and Oregon, now follow an open-files practice.
76. UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, ACADEMIC PERSONNEL MANUAL §§ 160-0, 160-20 &
app. A (1984).
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before releasing the contents of their letters.77
In its suit to have the Act declared invalid and unenforceable, the
University argued that the law impinged on the University's "constitu-
tional and academic freedom to determine who shall teach and conduct
research. ' 78 In granting summary judgment for the University, the court
rejected the state Attorney General's argument that the law "reflected a
statewide legislative policy favoring access by employees to those records
which their employers rely upon in making personnel decisions about
them. ' 79 The superior court decision on the Open Files Act was not
appealed and the law's validity remains unsettled. The University con-
tinues to maintain its own policies on confidentiality.
Supporters of confidentiality claim that it encourages evaluators to
be forthright and candid, while its opponents argue that confidentiality
can also mask bias, bigotry, and discriminatory attitudes on the part of
those who are ostensibly evaluating the quality of the faculty member's
scholarship and teaching. According to the latter view, confidentiality
may also hide the use of selective, arbitrary, or impermissible criteria for
evaluation, or the presence of decision-makers who may have a conflict
of interest.
The protection generally afforded university records is an issue in
universities and courts across the United States. Legally compelled ex-
ceptions to the confidentiality of academic records originate from a vari-
ety of sources, including state and federal public records legislation,80
legislation concerning individual rights of access, 81 investigatory powers
of state and federal agencies, 82 state open meetings laws (sunshine
77. CAL. EDUC. CODE § 92612(c) (West 1978 & Supp. 1987).
78. Complaint for Declaratory Relief, Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. Younger, No.
26642 (Super. Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles, filed Dec. 18, 1978).
79. Notice and Motion for Preliminary Injunction, Deukmejian v. Regents of the Univ.
of Cal., No. 26642 (Super. Ct. Cal., County of Los Angeles, filed Jan. 19, 1979).
80. Freedom of Information Act, 5 U.S.C. § 552 (1982); California Public Records Act,
CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 6250-6265 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986).
81. Information Practices Act, CAL. CIV. CODE §§ 1798-1798.78 (West 1985 & Supp.
1987), sets forth procedures for providing access to and protection of personal information
contained in state agency records. This statute protects the confidentiality of sources of letters
of recommendation and other evaluations used in the personnel process. Id. §§ 1798.3,
1798.34. The subject of such evaluations may receive copies of the text only after the name of
the author and any other identifying information has been deleted; alternatively, the subject
may be given only a summary of the contents of the material. Id. § 1798.38. Federal Family
Educational Privacy and Rights Act, 20 U.S.C. § 1232g (1982), popularly known as the Buck-
ley Act, gives students access to their admissions files and other records while limiting the
conditions under which such records may be released to others. See Implementing Regula-
tions, Privacy Rights of Parents and Children, 34 C.F.R. pt. 99 (1979).
82. For example, under Exec. Order No. 11246 41 C.F.R. § 60-1.7(a) (1986), universities
are annually required to file an EEO-6 report (Equal Employment Opportunity Higher Educa-
tion Staff Information Report) detailing by job category the race, ethnic, and sex composition
of the employment work force. Smith, Protecting the Confidentiality of Peer Records: Depart-
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laws), 3 constitutional due process protections, 84 and discovery rights
during litigation.85
The issue of confidentiality commonly arises during litigation when
a plaintiff, usually one alleging discrimination in university employment
proceedings, seeks to discover his or her own personnel records. For
instance, in one case alleging discrimination by the University of Califor-
nia, a professor who had been refused tenure sought discovery of her
personnel file. The court denied discovery of communications written in
"official confidence."186 The court found "an important state interest" in
safeguarding the confidentiality of the communications at issue, agreeing
with the University that "confidentiality is a prerequisite to the effective-
ness of a peer evaluation system of faculty selection."' 87
Universities and their administrators have argued that courts should
establish a qualified "academic freedom" privilege to protect confidential
ment of Records v. The University of California, 8 J.C. & U.L. 20, 31-32 (1981). The govern-
ment may require a contractor to furnish such information as it deems necessary for the
administration of the order. Id. at 32. In June of 1978, the Department of Labor filed an
Administrative Complaint charging the University of California with violation of its contrac-
tual commitments under Executive Order 11246 by failing to provide the government with
copies of confidential academic personnel records. Id. at 45-46. The Secretary of Labor ulti-
mately ruled against the University's claim that a legal privilege should attach to the records in
question and ordered cancellation of the Berkeley campus's existing government contracts and
debarment from future contracts. Id. at 51. After this order, the University and the govern-
ment entered into negotiations ultimately resulting in a consent decree.
83. See Simon, The Application of State Sunshine Laws to Institutions of Higher Educa-
tion, 4 J.C. & U.L. 83 (1976-77). The Federal Open Meetings Act is codified at 5 U.S.C.
§ 552(b) (1982).
84. See infra notes 108-120 and accompanying text.
85. The following section of this Note discusses the rights of plaintiffs seeking to discover
their personnel records in the course of litigation against a university. A related issue concerns
the protection from discovery of academic research. The Seventh Circuit has recognized a
"researcher's privilege," which shielded from discovery by a private corporation the notes,
reports, working papers, and raw data of two University of Wisconsin researchers. Dow
Chem. v. Allen, 672 F.2d 1262, 1274-77 (7th Cir. 1982). The court held that a researcher's
right to academic freedom "extends as readily to the scholar in the laboratory as to the teacher
in the classroom." Id. at 1275. The court noted, however, that a different result might be
warranted if discovery were sought by a government agency such as the E.P.A. Id. at 1273-76.
86. McKillop v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 386 F. Supp. 1270, 1277-78 (N.D. Cal.
1975).
87. Id. at 1276. But see In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426, 432 (5th Cir. 1981), in which the
court stated:
Persons occupying positions of responsibility... often must make difficult decisions.
The consequence of such iesponsibility is that occasionally the decision-maker will be
called upon to explain his actions. In such a case, he must have the courage to stand
up and publicly account for his decision. If that means that a few weak-willed indi-
viduals will be deterred from serving in positions of public trust, so be it; society is
better off without their services. If the decision-maker has acted for legitimate rea-
sons, he has nothing to fear.
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documents in academic personnel records.8 8 Two leading cases have ad-
dressed the question of establishing an evidentiary privilege for peer re-
view materials. In both cases, professors serving on peer review
committees sought to keep their individual votes confidential during liti-
gation by claiming an "academic freedom privilege." The Fifth Circuit,
in In re Dinnan, 8 9 refused to recognize such a privilege, while the Second
Circuit, in Gray v. Board of Higher Education, 90 recognized the privilege
but found it to be outweighed by the plaintiff's need to prove discrimina-
tory intent.91 Despite its result, Gray affirmed the importance of confi-
dentiality of peer review records by recognizing the claimed "academic
freedom privilege."
Cases upholding the confidentiality of documents in an academic
plaintiff's personnel file tend to reflect the courts' traditional reluctance
to intervene in academic disputes-a reluctance rooted in the doctrine of
academic freedom and traditional judicial deference to university actions.
As one leading commentator notes:
While there are many cases in which judges refuse to hold colleges
or universities accountable in court due to some facet of the particular
institution's legal identity, there are also numerous cases in which the
courts, as a matter of common law, refuse to intrude on the academic
process. The courts have traditionally refused to interfere in the basic
academic process of the university, particularly in the evaluation of
students or faculty. 92
Judicial deference or "academic abstention," as it is sometimes
termed, has been particularly troublesome in cases involving claims of
race or sex discrimination in promotion and tenure decisions.93 Studies
of the results in Title VII cases are instructive in this regard.
88. See generally Smith, supra note 82 (statutory or qualified first amendment privilege
necessary to protect against erosion of the peer review system); Comment, Preventing Unneces-
sary Intrusions on University Autonomy: A Proposed Academic Freedom Privilege, 69 CALIF. L.
REV. 1538, 1539 (1981) (U.S. Constitution and common law provide basis for an "academic
freedom" privilege). But see Gregory, Secrecy in University and College Tenure Deliberations:
Placing Appropriate Limits on Academic Freedom, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1023 (1983) (an
evidentiary privilege is in derogation of the principles upon which academic freedom is based);
Note, Academic Freedom Privilege: An Excessive Solution to the Problem of Protecting Confi-
dentiality, I U. CIN. L. REv. 326 (1982) (no basis exists for a general privilege).
89. 661 F.2d 426, 427 (5th Cir. 1981) (alleging sex discrimination).
90. 692 F.2d 901 (2d Cir. 1982) (alleging race discrimination).
91. Id. at 905, 908-09. The Seventh Circuit has also recognized a qualified evidentiary
privilege, requiring a showing of need before ordering disclosure of the names and identities of
peer reviewers. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. University of Notre Dame du
Lac, 715 F.2d 331, 337-38 (7th Cir. 1983).
92. H. EDWARDS & V. NORDIN, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE LAW 14 (1979).
93. The doctrine of academic abstention has probably had one of its clearest manifesta-
tions, and its most dramatic impact, in the area of academic sex discrimination, where none of
the first thirty-odd cases reported was decided in favor of the plaintiff faculty member. Id.; see
also Lee, Balancing Confidentiality and Disclosure in Faculty Peer Review: Impact of Title VII
Litigation, 9 J.C. & U.L. 279, 281-82 (1983).
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Partly as a consequence of academic insularity, the relative repre-
sentation and status of women faculty members at colleges and universi-
ties from the 1930s to the 1970s deteriorated. One study found that the
"proportion of women serving in academic positions actually de-
clined."' 94 Another study noted that the proportion of women appointed
to tenured teaching positions has been significantly lower than that of
women who have earned doctorates, while the proportion of appointed
men has been correspondingly higher than that expected from the
number of degrees awarded. The researchers stated that "[e]ven if a wo-
man is hired to a faculty position, it is very likely that she will encounter
a struggle when it comes to promotion .... Most women are clustered
at the lower ranks, in nonladder research and lecturer positions, and in
the less prestigious institutions." 95
In an effort to limit insularity in the name of academic freedom, and
to help alleviate sex-based discrimination, Congress in 1972 extended Ti-
tle VII of the Civil Rights Act of 196496 to institutions of higher educa-
tion. A passage from the Report of the House Committee on Education
and Labor expressed Congress' intent in extending Title VII: "Discrimi-
nation against minorities and women in the field of education is as perva-
sive as discrimination in any other area of employment. . . . The
committee feels that discrimination in educational institutions is espe-
cially critical."'97
Despite Congress' clear intent and the persistent problem of dis-
crimination, courts have narrowed the scope of Title VII in hiring, reap-
pointment, promotion, and tenure cases brought against universities.98
Generally, as a result of judicial deference, faculty plaintiffs have faced a
heavier burden of proof and university defendants a lighter one than have
litigants in Title VII cases arising in other employment settings. 99 Conse-
quently, academic plaintiffs in Title VII suits have suffered from a nota-
ble lack of success. 10
94. K. DAVIDSON, R. GINSBURG & H. KAY, SEX-BASED DISCRIMINATION 870 (1974).
95. WOMEN IN ACADEMIA: EVOLVING POLICIES TOWARD EQUAL OPPORTUNITIES 2
(E. Wasserman, A. Lewin & L. Bleiweis, eds. 1975).
96. Pub. L. No. 88-352, §§ 701-716, 78 Stat. 241, 253-66 (1964) (codified as amended at
42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e to 2000e-17 (1982)).
97. HOUSE COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, EQUAL EMPLOYMENT OPPORTUNITY
ACT OF 1972, H.R. Rep. No. 238, 92d Cong., 1st Sess. 19-20, reprinted in 1972 U.S. CODE
CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 2137, 2155.
98. Note, Title VII on Campus: Judicial Review of University Employment Decisions, 82
COLUM. L. REV. 1206, 1213-16 (1982) (analyzing standards of review and burdens of proof in
Title VII cases related to academic employment); see also Lee, supra note 93; Tepker, Title
VII, Equal Employment Opportunity, and Academic Autonomy: Toward a Principled Defer-
ence, 16 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1047 (1983) (exploring-the influence of judicial solicitude for
institutional academic autonomy in Title VII cases).
99. See Note, supra note 98, at 1213.
100. See, e.g., Yurko, Judicial Recognition of Academic Collective Interests: A New Ap-
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A number of courts, however, have recognized that the traditional
judicial "anti-interventionist policy has rendered colleges and universities
virtually immune to charges of employment bias,"101 at least when bias is
not expressed overtly. In Powell v. Syracuse University, 10 2 the Second Cir-
cuit, criticizing the doctrine of judicial deference in academic matters,
disaffirmed its earlier position in Faro v. New York University,10 3 stating
that "the commonsense position we took in Faro, namely that courts
must be ever-mindful of relative institutional competences, has been
pressed beyond all reasonable limits, and may be employed to undercut
the explicit legislative intent of the Civil Rights Act of 1964." 104 Simi-
larly, in Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 105 the Third Circuit rejected the
defendant's assertion that the district court's order, forcing the college to
promote the plaintiff and award back pay, was "an unwarranted intru-
sion by the judiciary into the academic mission of an educational institu-
tion which ... threatens academic freedom itself."' 0 6 The court stated
that "[t]he fact that the discrimination in this case took place in an aca-
demic rather than commercial setting does not permit the court to abdi-
cate its responsibility to insure the award of a meaningful remedy."' 10 7
Some courts have also limited the application of "academic absten-
tion" in cases involving a plaintiff's right of access to peer review
records. In Lynn v. Regents of the University of California, 10 8 the Ninth
Circuit held that, in the context of a discrimination suit, denying a plain-
tiff access to peer review records would violate due process. The district
court had reviewed the plaintiff's personnel file in camera, but had re-
fused disclosure to the plaintiff. On appeal, the Ninth Circuit stated that
a fair and accurate resolution of the issue of discrimination required vig-
orous and informed argument and that, to be adequately informed, the
parties must see the evidence. 1a9 The Third and Fifth Circuits have also
required disclosure of peer review records when a plaintiff alleges dis-
crimination, but these courts did not rely on due process grounds. 10
proach to Faculty Title VIl Litigation, 60 B.U.L. REv. 473, 482-506 (1980). Out of 40 sample
cases surveyed, the defendant university won in 24 cases, the plaintiff won in eight, four plain-
tiffs withstood summary judgment motions by the defense, three defendants succeeded in their
summary judgment motions, and one case was reversed after trial because an improper burden
of proof was placed upon the plaintiff.
101. Powell v. Syracuse Univ., 580 F.2d 1150, 1153 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 439 U.S. 984
(1978).
102. Id.
103. 502 F.2d 1229 (2d Cir. 1974).
104. Powell, 580 F.2d at 1153.
105. 621 F.2d 532 (3d Cir. 1980).
106. Id. at 547.
107. Id. at 550; accord Sweeney v. Board of Trustees, 569 F.2d 169, 176 (1st Cir. 1978)
(rejecting judicial deference).
108. 656 F.2d 1337 (9th Cir. 1981).
109. Id. at 1345-46.
110. Equal Employment Opportunity Comm'n v. Franklin & Marshall College, 775 F.2d
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Few courts have gone so far as to claim that denying a plaintiff ac-
cess to peer review records would constitute a due process violation. In
contrast to Lynn, the Ninth Circuit affirmed without opinion a trial
court's refusal to find a right of access to peer review records in LaBorde
v. Regents of University of California, II another case involving confiden-
tiality. In LaBorde, the plaintiff complained that she should be allowed
access to information explaining why she was not promoted. The trial
court disagreed, noting that the University's multi-step review process
necessarily protected candidates from abuses.112 While courts have
tended to accept an institution's procedures without question, most have
not addressed the issue of whether a multi-step review process curbs the
potential abuse of evaluations conducted in secret, but have simply con-
cluded that a review process that is lengthy and thorough is sufficiently
fair. 113
The due process issue is complicated by the fact that only tenured
faculty have a property interest in their jobs and are, therefore, entitled
to due process protection under the fourteenth amendment. 1 4 The Cali-
110 117 (3d Cir. 1985); In re Dinnan, 661 F.2d 426 427 (5th Cir. 1981); Jepsen v. Florida Bd.
of Regents, 610 F.2d 1379 1384 (5th Cir. 1980). The Third Circuit refused to reverse a district
court's order compelling Franklin and Marshall College to comply with a subpoena duces
tecum issued by the EEOC during an investigation of a charge of discrimination. 775 F.2d at
117. The court declined to follow the Seventh and Second Circuits in recognizing either a
qualified academic privilege or in adopting a balancing approach. Id. at 114. The court stated,
"we have no choice but to trust that the honesty and integrity of the tenured reviewers in
evaluation decisions will overcome feelings of discomfort and embarrassment and will outlast
the demise of absolute confidentiality." Id. at 115. The Fifth Circuit, in Jepsen, held that the
trial court must "weigh the potential harm from disclosure of privileged communications
against the benefits of disclosure." 610 F. 2d at 1384. The court stated that "caution against
intervention in a university's affairs cannot be allowed to undercut the explicit legislative intent
of Title VII." Id. at 1383. The same court, in In re Dinnan, stated that "no privilege exists
that would enable Professor Dinnan to withhold information regarding his vote on the promo-
tion of the appellee. This result is required on the basis of fundamental principles of fairness
and sound public policy." 661 F.2d at 427.
111. 495 F. Supp. 1067 (C.D. Cal. 1980), aff'd, 686 F.2d 715 (9th Cir. 1982), cert. denied,
459 U.S, 1178 (1983).
112. Id. at 1069. At the University of California, decisions on hiring, promotion, and
tenure are final and nonappealable. Academic personnel may file a grievance with the Commit-
tee on Privilege and Tenure which "may" investigate the complaint. While the Committee
may make a recommendation to the Chancellor that a particular case be reopened, or even
reversed, the Committee has no authority to order the Chancellor to do so. See UNIVERSITY
OF CALIFORNIA, ACADEMIC PERSONNEL MANUAL § 160 & app. A (rev. July 5, 1984); see also
UNIVERSITY OF CALIFORNIA, ACADEMIC SENATE BY-LAW 113.
113. See, e.g., Smith v. University of N.C., 632 F.2d 316, 343 (4th Cir. 1980). But see
Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234, 250 (1957) (Warren, C.J.) ("Scholarship cannot
flourish in an atmosphere of suspicion and distrust."); Joint Anti-Fascist Refugee Comm. v.
McGrath, 341 U.S. 123, 171 (1953) (Frankfurter, J., concurring) ("Secrecy is not congenial to
truth-seeking.").
114. See Board of Regents v. Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577-78 (1972) (a "unilateral expecta-
tion" of tenure not property for due process purposes); Perry v. Sindermann, 408 U.S. 593, 602
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fornia Supreme Court, however, has held that when an individual is sub-
ject to deprivatory governmental action, that individual has a due
process interest in fair and unprejudiced decision-making. 115 This same
concern is reflected in the California Supreme Court's application of the
common-law rule of "fair procedure." The doctrine of "fair procedure"
requires that, since all individuals have a fundamental right to practice a
lawful profession, entities possessing substantial power to interfere with
that right cannot thwart an individual's pursuit of such a profession
without following fair procedures.1 16 In Ezekieal v. Winkley, 11 7 the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court held that a hospital could not discharge a surgeon
from its residency program without affording him a fair procedure, be-
cause the discharge would effectively prevent his acceptance into any
other such program. The denial of tenure to an assistant professor by a
major university such as the University of California presents no less for-
midable an obstacle to career advancement. The United States Supreme
Court has recognized similar principles. In Greene v. McElroy,118 the
government's revocation of an aeronautical engineer's security clearance
resulted in termination of his employment with a private company. The
Supreme Court held that the revocation, based as it was on information
from unidentified persons, deprived Greene of the traditional procedural
protections of confrontation and cross-examination:
Certain principles have remained relatively immutable in our ju-
risprudence. One of these is that where governmental action seriously
injures an individual.., the evidence used to prove the Government's
case must be disclosed to the individual so that he has an opportunity
to show that it is untrue.... [This] is even more important where the
evidence consists of the testimony of individuals .... 19
Although untenured faculty have no property interest in their jobs
for fourteenth amendment purposes, California has devised its own stan-
dard of due process protection for cases of deprivatory government ac-
tion. Professors eligible for tenure should also be entitled to such
protection as long-term probationary employees and, at the very least,
entitled to the California doctrine of fair procedure. The Greene stan-
dard, as well as California's procedural protections, accord the individual
alleging injury the right to see the evidence on which deprivation of em-
(1972) (plaintiff must have a "legitimate claim of entitlement" to tenure). See generally THE
CONSTITUTIONAL STATUS OF ACADEMIC TENURE (W. Metzger ed. 1977).
115. People v. Ramirez, 25 Cal. 3d 260, 268, 599 P.2d 622, 627; 158 Cal. Rptr. 316, 320
(1979).
116. Pinsker v. Pacific Coast Soc'y of Orthodontists, 12 Cal. 3d 41, 549-54, 526 P.2d 253,
259-62, 116 Cal. Rptr. 245, 251-54 (1974); Bixby v. Pierno, 4 Cal. 3d 130, 143, 481 P.2d 242,
251, 93 Cal. Rptr. 234, 243 (1971); James v. Marinship Corp., 25 Cal. 2d 721, 740, 155 P.2d
329, 340 (1944).
117. 20 Cal. 3d 267, 278-79, 572 P.2d 32, 39-40, 142 Cal. Rptr. 418, 425-26 (1977).
118. 360 U.S. 474 (1959).
119. Id. at 496.
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ployment was based. The necessity for this right is at the heart of the
cases allowing academic plaintiffs access to their peer review records.
In the peer review cases, as in Greene, the interests of administrative
confidentiality and adversarial determination of truth compete for pre-
dominance. At least one state appellate court has fashioned a compro-
mise solution balancing these competing interests. In Board of Trustees
of Leland Stanford Jr. University v. Superior Court, 120 the court recog-
nized a state interest in preserving confidentiality as to the identities of
peer review evaluations, but not in maintaining the confidentiality of the
contents of the letters of reference at issue. The court held that "privacy
rights ...will be fully respected by the witholding of the names and
other identification of the confidential communications' authors." 121
This is precisely what the Open Files Act sought to do.
The Open Files Act provided an opportunity at the administrative
level for individuals employed by the state to counter potentially seri-
ously injurious action through the most traditional and valued form of
fair procedure. The Act is part of a statewide legislative scheme, affect-
ing the University of California no more, yet no less, than it affects other
public and private entities. Similar statutes grant other state employees
access to their personnel records.122 Furthermore, the California Public
Records Act 123 protects an individual's privacy interest in his or her per-
sonnel files. This protection is supported by the privacy guarantee of the
California Constitution, 124 which the California Supreme Court has in-
terpreted as protecting the rights of citizens to have a "reasonable check
on the accuracy of existing records" concerning them. 125 Other statutes
have implemented this same interest, protecting the rights of individuals
to inspect their own criminal records, 126 credit records, 127 and informa-
tion collected on them by insurance agencies.' 28 These provisions, and
others like them, demonstrate quite clearly that the legislature has deter-
mined such rights of access to be a matter of general statewide concern.
120. 119 Cal. App. 3d 516, 174 Cal. Rptr. 160 (1981).
121. Id. at 532, 174 Cal. Rptr. at 168.
122. See, eg., CAL. EDUC. CODE § 89546 (West 1978 & Supp. 1986) (state university and
college employees); id. § 87031 (community college employees); id. § 44031 (elementary and
secondary school employees); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 19992.2 (West 1980 & Supp. 1987) (state
civil service employees). Nonacademic University of California employees are covered by
CAL. CIv. CODE § 1798.34 (West 1985 & Supp. 1986).
123. CAL. GOV'T CODE § 6254 (West 1980 & Supp. 1986).
124. CAL. CONsT. art. I, § 1 ("All people ... have certain inalienable rights, among which
are those of... pursuing and obtaining safety, happiness, and privacy.").
125. White v. Davis, 13 Cal. 3d 757, 775, 533 P.2d 222, 234, 120 Cal. Rptr. 94, 106 (1975).
126. CAL. PENAL CODE §§ 11120-11125 (West 1982).
127. CAL. CIV. CODE § 1785.16 (West 1985).
128. CAL. INS. CODE § 791.13 (West Supp. 1986).
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IV. Autonomy and Academic Freedom
Universities base their claims to confidentiality of personnel records
on academic freedom 129 and institutional autonomy. 130 Although aca-
demic freedom has received its most explicit constitutional protection as
an individual right,131 its historic roots lie in the independence of aca-
demic institutions from other centers of power. The medieval university
first shielded from outside pressures the freedom to teach and to learn.
The economic power acquired by universities, and the respect that learn-
ing commanded both for its own sake and as an adjunct to theology, gave
universities influence and leeway against encroachment by state or
church. Institutional autonomy arose as a concept justifying this
independence.132
The judiciary's traditional deference towards academic decision-
making has favored this autonomy, and thus favored university policies.
This apparent indulgence toward universities has deep roots in American
jurisprudence. 133 But according to one leading commentary, "[a]t the
present time the concept of autonomy for the [academic] institution is
more an ideological expression of academic custom and usage than a spe-
cifically enunciated legal doctrine." 134 Another commentator, general
counsel for a major university, stated in a recent article that the "past
quarter century has been a tumultuous time for colleges and their law-
yers who often have had to explain to trustees and presidents that educa-
tion law is changing and that their old prerogatives are being eroded."' 135
The author went on to argue:
In the past twenty-five years, commentators and courts alike have
scrutinized the premises and scope of academic freedom and have
questioned the motives of those in higher education who reflexively
brandish the term to ward off investigation and criticism of decisions
made in an academic institution. A few have even questioned the logic
and propriety of judicial deference to academic decisions of colleges
129. See supra note 6.
130. Institutional autonomy does not equate with constitutional autonomy. Not all public
universities have constitutional autonomy. All universities, public and private, claim some
sort of institutional autonomy.
131. See, eg., Sweezy v. New Hampshire, 354 U.S. 234 (1957).
132. See R. HOFSTADTER & W. METZGER, THE DEVELOPMENT OF ACADEMIC FREE-
DOM IN THE UNITED STATES 3-14 (1955).
133. See supra text accompanying note 16; see also Bracken v. Visitors of William & Mary
College, 7 Va. (3 Call.) 573 (1790) (governing board had the power to modify the college in
any way it deemed proper).
134. H. EDWARDS & V. NORDIN, supra note 92, at 17.
135. Fishbein, New Strings on the Ivory Tower: The Growth of Accountability in Colleges
and Universities, 12 J.C. & U.L. 381, 381 (1985). The author is general counsel for Johns
Hopkins University.
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and universities.136
A number of courts have begun to reappraise the deferential judicial
treatment granted to universities. 137 This reappraisal, when applied to
protect rather than to endanger academic freedom, can only bolster the
purposes of autonomy.
When nonacademic (or antiacademic) values enter into a univer-
sity's decision-making, the justification for protecting that university's
autonomy disappears. A university does not have an academic freedom
interest in decisions unrelated to promoting scholarship or setting aca-
demic goals.1 38 As one court stated, "[a]cademic freedom is illusory
when it does not protect faculty from censorious practices but rather
serves as a veil for those who might act as censors."1 39 The same court
stated that "[u]nreviewable committee tenure decisions may promote the
robust exchange of views within the sealed confines of the committee
room but also serve to exclude tenure candidates from the college cam-
pus because of their race."'14
In In re Dinnan, 1 41 the Fifth Circuit stated, "[t]he appellant [univer-
sity] construes the term 'academic freedom' to include more than it
does.... Indeed, if the concept were extended as far as the appellant
argues, it would rapidly become a double-edged sword threatening the
very core of values that it now protects." 142 The court refused to allow
the use of academic freedom as a justification for giving universities "a
carte blanche to practice discrimination of all types."' 43 The court noted
that United States Supreme Court cases upholding academic freedom all
involved "an attempt to suppress ideas by the government. Ideas may be
suppressed just as effectively by denying tenure as by prohibiting the teach-
ing of certain courses."'44
Extension of academic freedom beyond the protection of academic
values could have the perverse result of permitting a university to use its
first amendment rights to "reduce dissent or diversity within its own
ranks by asserting the primacy of institutional interests over those of its
individual members." 145 Indeed, university autonomy and academic free-
136. Id. at 383 (citing H.T. EDWARDS, HIGHER EDUCATION AND THE UNHOLY CRU-
SADE AGAINST GOVERNMENTAL REGULATION (1980)).
137. See supra notes 101-10 and accompanying text.
138. See Kunda v. Muhlenberg College, 621 F.2d 532, 547-48 (3d Cir. 19 0) (supporting
the doctrine of judicial deference in tenure cases, but refusing to apply it when plaintiff was a
victim of discrimination).
139. Gray v. Board of Higher Educ. 692 F.2d 901, 909 (2d Cir. 1982).
140. Id. at 909 n.15.
141. 661 F.2d 426 (5th Cir. 1981).
142. Id. at 430.
143. Id. at 431.
144. Id. at 430 (emphasis in original).
145. McCormack, Regulatory Problems in the Modern University Setting, 1980 UTAH L.
REV. 461, 463.
July 1987]
dom are not identical. 146 One commentator observes that, in some Euro-
pean university contexts, autonomy might function as an enemy of
academic freedom, particularly from the standpoint of the junior teach-
ing staff. 147 University governing boards can, and have, limited the aca-
demic freedom of university members far more restrictively than has
government.148 Yet institutions frequently base their claim to autonomy
in nonacademic areas, or in areas tangential to academic processes, on
the rationale of academic freedom.149
The elasticity of the concepts of academic freedom and autonomy
has extended their protection into areas well beyond the academic values
that they were designed to protect. With its vast reach, an institution
like the University of California should not be hermetically exempted
from the public policy legislation that controls virtually every other state
entity in a similar position. In passing the Prevailing Wage Rate Act and
the Open Files Act, the California Legislature expressed legitimate state-
wide concerns regarding the fair treatment of a large number of state
employees.
The policy of applying this sort of legislation to universities has
gained wide acceptance. In 1973, the Supreme Court of Michigan ad-
dressed the relationship of the University of Michigan, the oldest consti-
tutionally autonomous University in the country, to its employees. 150
The court held that interns, residents, and postdoctoral fellows con-
nected with University of Michigan hospital and its affiliates are public
employees who have rights to organize and bargain collectively under the
provisions of the Michigan Public Employee Relations Act'5 ' without
infringing on the constitutional autonomy of the Board of Regents. The
court reasoned that the autonomy sought by the University in the labor
146. For an excellent discussion of the relationship between academic freedom and institu-
tional autonomy, see Finkin, On "Institutional" Academic Freedom, 61 TEx. L. REV. 817
(1983) (theory of institutional academic freedom collapses the distinction between the two).
According to Finkin, "the theory of 'institutional' academic freedom would constitutionalize
the concept of administrative prerogative that the American professoriate struggled against at
the turn of the century, and it would do so, perversely, in the name of academic freedom." Id.
at 854.
147. UNIVERSITIES IN THE WESTERN WORLD 62 (P. Seabury ed. 1975).
148. See, e.g., Searle v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 23 Cal. App. 3d 448, 451-53, 100 Cal.
Rptr. 194, 195-96 (1972) (Regents, not faculty, have power to authorize, supervise, and give
credit for a course).
149. See A. Zusman, supra note 26, at 16; see also Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. City of
Santa Monica, 77 Cal. App. 3d 130, 135-37, 143 Cal. Rptr. 276, 280-81 (1978) (Regents ex-
empt from local building codes and zoning regulations as well as local permit and inspection
fees); supra text accompanying notes 25-27.
150. Regents of the Univ. of Mich. v. Michigan Employment Relations Comm'n, 389
Mich. 96, 204 N.W.2d 218 (1973). The University of Michigan was established in the 1850
Constitution of Michigan. MICH. CONST. art. XIII, §§ 6-8; see L. GLENNY & T.K. DAL-
GLISH, supra note 28, at 17; CHARTERS AND BASIC LAWS, supra note 28, at 346.
151. MICH. COMP. LAWS ANN. §§ 423.201-.216 (West 1972).
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relations area was unnecessary for it to maintain the control and manage-
ment of its affairs. The court concluded that
[t]he desires of the framers of the 1850 and subsequent constitu-
tions to provide autonomy to the Board of Regents in the educational
sphere have been protected by our Court for over a century. This con-
cern for the educational process to be controlled by the Regents does
not and cannot mean that they are exempt from all the laws of the
state. When the University of Michigan was founded in the 19th Cen-
tury it was comparatively easy to isolate the University and keep it free
from outside interference. The complexities of modem times makes
[sic] this impossible.152
The appearance of collective bargaining on campuses represents a
break with the long-standing tradition that unions had no place in the
world of the university. 153 In 1973, the American Association of Univer-
sity Professors joined the American Federation of Teachers and the Na-
tional Education Association in endorsing collective bargaining in higher
education.1 54 Seven years later, in NLRB v. Yeshiva University, 15 5 the
United States Supreme Court considered for the first time how federal
bargaining principles developed to deal with industrial labor-manage-
ment relations apply to private academic institutions. A bare majority of
the Court held that Yeshiva's full-time faculty members were "manage-
rial employees" and thus excluded from the coverage of the Taft-Hartley
Act. 156 Justice Brennan dissented:
[T]he Court's perception of the Yeshiva faculty's status is distorted by
the rose-colored lens through which it views the governance structure
of the modern-day university. The Court's conclusion that the
faculty's professional interests are indistinguishable from those of the
administration is bottomed on an idealized model of collegial decision-
making that is a vestige of the great medieval university. But the uni-
versity of today bears little resemblance to the "community of
scholars" of yesteryear. 157
Justice Brennan thus recognized what one scholar has called "the
continuing confrontation of the 19th century perspective with the reali-
ties of 20th century academic life." 158 The California Legislature effec-
tively agreed with Justice Brennan in adopting the Higher Education
152. Michigan Regents, 389 Mich. at 106-07, 204 N.W.2d at 223 (footnote omitted).
153. H. EDWARDS & V. NORDIN, supra note 92, at 292.
154. American Association of University Professors Statement on Collective Bargaining,
AAUP Bulletin (Summer 1973).
155. 444 U.S. 672 (1980).
156. Id. at 686-90. The Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), 29 U.S.C.
§§ 141-197 (1982), protects the employees of covered employers in the "exercise ... of full
freedom of association, self-organization, and designation of representatives of their own
choosing, for the purpose of negotiating the terms and conditions of their employment or other
mutual aid or protection." Id. § 151.
157. Yeshiva, 444 U.S. at 702 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
158. Finkin, Toward a Law of Academic Status, 22 BUFFALO L. REv. 575, 576 (1973).
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Employer-Employee Relations Act (HEERA).1 59
HEERA granted the right of collective bargaining to higher educa-
tion employees (faculty and staff) within the University of California and
the State Colleges and Universities systems. In enacting HEERA, the
legislature negated the ruling of a 1958 California Court of Appeal case
which had held that University of California building and construction
trade employees were public employees and therefore did not have the
same right to bargain collectively as their counterparts in private indus-
try.1 60 In enacting HEERA, the legislature showed its power to limit
University autonomy when statewide public policy concerns dictate such
a result.
In acceding to HEERA, the University implicitly recognized both
this power and the significance of the policies behind it. Before HEERA,
the autonomy granted to the University seemed to inhere in a unified,
self-identical body. Since HEERA, the adversarial, internally conflicted
character of University labor relations is legally recognized. Under such
circumstances, University autonomy no longer appears a neutral grant.
Rather, it forces the University administration to deal with a legally
equal,1 61 contradictory group. HEERA thus represents a curtailing of
some University autonomy in an effort to promote a broader societal pol-
icy--collective bargaining-which the University itself might never have
voluntarily promoted.
The issue, then, is whether the legislature has the right to regulate
this conflict. This Note has already examined the difficulty that aca-
demic plaintiffs confront in arguing discriminatory conduct by universi-
ties in the face of practices of confidentiality. This difficulty exemplifies
the adversarial relations between academic employers and employees
that argue for limited legislative and judicial oversight.
Courts have begun to realize that their traditional deference toward
universities as defendants cannot be allowed to lead to judicial abdication
of the role courts must play in enforcing the mandates of Title VII and
other civil rights statutes. California courts must now recognize that as
the University of California has grown, its autonomy has correspond-
ingly diminished. The process of growth has been in large part a volun-
tary one. With it the University has thrived. But the University cannot
expect to continue to involve itself in the social, political, and economic
world around it while maintaining a fictional "autonomous" status as
protection against accountability. That accountability is nowhere more
significant, and necessary, than in the area of personnel relations. The
passage of HEERA demonstrates the University's recognition that its
159. CAL. GOV'T CODE §§ 3560-3599 (West Supp. 1986).
160. Newmarker v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 160 Cal. App. 2d 640, 645-46, 325 P.2d
558, 561-62 (1958).
161. Le., granted by law the power to bargain as an equal.
[Vol. 38
UNIVERSITY AUTONOMY
nearly 100,000 employees-academic and nonacademic-deserve to be
afforded the same protections that federal and state law afford to other
employees.
For many years, academic personnel stood on the borderline be-
tween professional (managerial) and employee (nonmanagerial) status.
HEERA represents California's break with Yeshiva and that case's as-
sumption that faculty are managerial rather than nonmanagerial person-
nel. In enacting the Open Files Act, the California Legislature attempted
to grant University of California faculty procedural protections similar to
those granted other state employees. The legislature has expressed no
interest in telling the University whom it should hire, promote, or fire; it
has simply attempted to extend to University faculty the due process and
fair procedure protections that California law grants to all California em-
ployees. Given the numbers of nontenured faculty members and the
public concern with opportunities in higher education for women and
minorities, legislative oversight of the procedures used in academic per-
sonnel decisions is appropriate.
A reexamination of the Prevailing Wage Rate Act might reach a
similar result. The court in San Francisco Labor Council 162 analogized
the autonomy of the University of California to the autonomy of Califor-
nia's charter cities. 163 The court's failure to even consider the incongrui-
ties in such an analogy are indicative of the court's traditional deference
towards the University. However, frank recognition that the University
is a multicity employer, dependent upon the legislature for its funds, yet
controlled by Regents who are not accountable in a representative capac-
ity to those they govern, should compel the conclusion that the state has
a legitimate interest in the wage rates of University employees. Like
HEERA, the Prevailing Wage Rate Act makes no attempt to tell the
University whom it should hire, promote, or fire; it simply expresses the
legislature's interest in ensuring that employees of state institutions be
paid fairly. The University's employment of over 75,000 staff throughout
the state strongly suggests that this interest is a matter of statewide con-
cern, rather than an exclusively University affair.
While the courts have not formulated a test for determining what
are "exclusively university affairs," one commentator has attempted to
do so. In a 1978 article entitled The Autonomy of the University of Cali-
fornia Under the State Constitution, '6 Harold W. Horowitz, Vice Chan-
cellor for Faculty Relations and Professor of Law, University of
California, Los Angeles, concluded: "If a legislative regulation signifi-
162. San Francisco Labor Council v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 26 Cal. 3d 785, 608
P.2d 277, 163 Cal. Rptr. 460 (1980); see supra text accompanying notes 66-74.
163. 26 Cal. 3d at 790-91, 608 P.2d at 279-80, 163 Cal. Rptr. at 462-63; see CAL. CONST.
art. XI, § 5.
164. 25 UCLA L. REv. 23 (1978).
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cantly impairs the powers of the Regents to govern the University with
respect to a central University affair, there should be a demonstrable
compelling interest advanced by the regulation in order to validate its
application to the University." 165 In reaching this conclusion, Professor
Horowitz relied heavily on the United States Supreme Court's decision in
National League of Cities v. Usery.166 Horowitz suggested three factors
to be examined in "determining the application of article IX, section 9 as
a limitation on the delegated lawmaking powers of the Legislature: (1)
the centrality of the subject matter to the functioning of the University as
a university; (2) the degree of impairment of the Regents' 'full' powers of
governance; and (3) the interest advanced by the legislative
enactment." 167
The factors Horowitz used in his analysis raise more questions than
they answer. The "centrality" factor raises the question of what func-
tions are "functions of the University as a university." This is very much
like asking what are "exclusively university affairs." As this Note has
shown, answering this question is not easy; implicated within it are com-
plex issues regarding the role the University plays in our society and in
our state. Horowitz' second factor-the "degree of impairment"-begs
the entire question: what are the Regents' "full" powers of governance?
The third factor, the interest advanced by the legislative enactment, can-
not be examined without a clearer idea of the policy against which we are
balancing the interest at issue.
These difficulties are not unlike those that lower courts faced as they
attempted to apply the test the Supreme Court formulated in Usery.168
In overruling Usery, the Supreme Court called the test "unworkable."1 69
"The goal of identifying 'uniquely' governmental functions.., has been
rejected by the Court... because the notion of a 'uniquely' governmental
function is unmanageable."' 170 As Usery had provided little guidance to
lower federal courts in their attempts to find where the reach of the Com-
merce Clause ends and state sovereignty begins, so Horowitz' test pro-
vides us little guidance in attempting to determine the limits of
University autonomy under the California Constitution.
This Note has argued that those limits must be construed in light of
the University as it exists today, and in light of the society that coexists
165. Id. at 44.
166. 426 U.S. 833 (1976).
167. Horowitz, supra note 11, at 36.
168. In Usery, the Supreme Court held that state sovereign immunity protects from federal
regulation under the Commerce Clause "functions essential to [the] separate and independent
existence" of "States as States." 426 U.S. at 845. The Court further defined the protected area
as that of "traditional governmental functions." Id. at 852.
169. Garcia v. San Antonio Metro. Transit Auth., 469 U.S. 528, 45 (1985).
170. Id.
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with it in this state. 171 Only in that light can we balance the interests of
University autonomy against the interests of the state as expressed by the
legislature. The California Legislature has expressed its concern with en-
suring fair treatment for University of California employees. The imple-
mentation of such a policy is a matter of statewide concern and poses no
threat to the values that University autonomy and academic freedom are
intended to protect.
Conclusion
The California Constitution vests the Regents of the University of
California with "full powers of organization and government, subject
only to such legislative control as may be necessary to insure the security
of [the University's] funds and compliance with the terms of [its] endow-
ments ... ," 172 California courts have interpreted these powers to mean
that the University shall have full control over "internal university af-
fairs," and shall be subject to legislative enactments only in "matters of
statewide concern."
Measured against this standard, several legislative attempts to regu-
late University labor practices governing both academic and nonaca-
demic personnel have been declared unconstitutional.
This Note has argued that, given the University's status as one of
California's major employers and economic entities, its constitutional au-
tonomy should be modified to allow for a greater degree of legislative
oversight, particularly in the area of personnel relations. The concerns
expressed by the legislature in this area indicate that, although direct
attempts to regulate University labor practices do impinge upon internal
University affairs, these affairs are, nonetheless, matters of statewide
concern.
Caitlin M. Scully*
171. In rejecting Usery's "attempt to draw the boundaries of state regulatory immunity in
terms of 'tradition governmental function,'" the Garcia Court stated, "[t]he most obvious
defect of a historical approach to state immunity is that it prevents a court from accommodat-
ing changes in the historical functions of States ...." Id. at 543. This Note has argued that
we must take a similar evolutionary approach to university autonomy.
172. CAL. CONST. art. IX, § 9.
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